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Summary findings
A foreign aid or foreign lending policy that focuses  One solution to the problem of fungibility, then, is that
exclusively on project financing may have unintended  donors could tie assistance to an overall public spending
consequences, report Devarajan and Swaroop. New  program (in the recipient country) that provides
research shows that aid intended  for crucial social and  adequate resources to crucial sectors.
economic sectors often merely substitutes for spending  To make this kind of reform operational,  Devarajan
that recipient governments would have undertaken  and Swaroop propose a new lending instrument: a public
anyway and the funds that are thereby freed up are spent  expenditure reform loan (PERL).  A PERL would tie an
for other purposes.  institution's lending strategy to the recipient country's
If the aid funds something that would have been done  achievement of mutually agreed-upon development
anyway, traditional ways of evaluating the aid's  goals.
effectiveness are not really accurate. If aid funds are  Everyone agrees that better donor  coordination is
fungible and the recipient's public spending program is  needed, but it has been difficult to achieve because some
unsatisfactory, project lending may not be cost-effective.  donors tend to prefer projects (usually with the national
If the recipient's public spending program is satisfactory,  flag flying over them). By agreeing on a public
perhaps the donor should finance a portion of it instead  expenditure program and financing a portion of it, the
of financing individual projects.  Bank can credibly ask other donors to do the same.
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*Preliminary  Dralf1. Introduction
Since  1960 nearly $1.7 trillion (measured in  1995 dollars) has flown from rich to poor
countries as foreign aid.'  In the 1990s, however, aid fatigue has been setting in.  With the end of the
Cold War and many rich countries facing their own fiscal problems, foreign-aid budgets are being
squeezed.  Donor governments and  aid agencies are asking new questions about whether the
assistance they provide is as effective as possible in promoting economic growth and reducing
poverty, two oft-stated development policy objectives.  ,Much  of this attention is focused on the
impact of foreign aid on public expenditures in recipient countries. Public expenditures have long
been considered one of the main channels through which foreign aid influences  development
outcomes. The donor community has been increasingly concemed that aid development assistance
earmarked for critical social and economic sectors is being used directly or indirectly to fund
unproductive expenditures including those on defense. 2
What has aid financed in developing countries?  What is the evidence on the "fungibility"
of aid?  What are the implications of aid fungibility for donors in assessing the impact of their
assistance programs?  These are the issues this paper addresses.
The paper is organized in three sections. In section 2, we first define aid fimgibility and then
analyze its conseq[uences. The section also provides a review of the literature on fungibility of
foreign aid.  The review examines the evidence-both  cross-country and country specific-on  the
link between foreign aid and the recipient country's public spending. In section 3 we develop a link
between fungibilily and a donor agency's lending strategy. Moreover, in light of the empirical
lBased on 36 years of data from 1960  to 1995  on Official  Development  Assistance  (OECD,  1997).
2See the UNDP'; Human  Development  Report  (UTNDP,  1994)  for an analysis  of the human  development
cost of arms imports  in developing  countries.findings on aid fungibility, we draw lessons for donor assistance and make recommendations for
designing better lending instruments.  In this section, we also define and provide a blue-print of a
new lending instrument-a  public expenditure reform loan (PERL).
2.  Fungibility of Economic Assistance
By providing assistance, foreign governments and international donor agencies attempt to
influence the public expenditure policies of recipient governments.  Similarly, in a federal system
of governance, subsidies and grants are used by governments to influence the budget of a subsidiary
goverunent.  Aid is also used to influence individual  behavior (e.g., food stamps). The link between
aid and the recipient's budgetary allocation, however, is not straightforward because some aid may
be "ifungible."  For example, if a government would have undertaken a donor-financed project in the
absence of that financing, then donor funds simply relax the government's budget constraint and
finance, at the margin, something else.  In a federal structure of governance, aid earmarked for a
subsidiary government could end up replacing funds that the federal government would have given
in the absence of that aid.  Similarly, food stamps or rent subsidies to poor individuals may end up
financing other consumption.
2.1  Aidfungibility:  A definition
Suppose an aid donor gives money to build a primary school in a poor country.  If the
recipient government would have built the school anyway, then the consequence of the aid is to
release resources for the government to spend on other items.  Thus, while the primary school may
still get built, the aid is financing some other expenditure (or tax reduction) by the government.  In
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This concept of fungibility could be illustrated a bit more rigorously.  Suppose a country
spends its total resources on a single private good, Cp, and two public goods, G, and G 2. All three
goods are normal (non-inferior).  It pays for these goods by means of  domestically generated
resources.  In addition to its own resources, the country receives earmarked assistance towards the
purchase of good G 2 from a donor agency. For simplicity, we assume that there is no impact of aid
on the relative price of the two goods. Figure 1 captures this scenario.  BB' represents allocation
choices that can be financed from domestic resources, and given the preferences of the recipient
country, point A represents the preferred resource allocation. An amount F of earmarked foreign aid
is given for  G2. The donor  agency and the recipient country are assumed  to have  different
preferences regarding how aid should be  spent.  (If they have identical preferences,  then the
distinction between earmarked aid or pure budgetary support has no meaning.)  While the donor
agency would like the aid funds to be spent on G2 at the margin, for a variety of reasons, it is unable
to monitor the intended pattern of public spending.  Upon receiving aid, therefore, the recipient4
country is able to make it fungible by changing both the level and composition  of  its public
expenditure program.
If the recipient country can treat the entire aid amount as a pure supplement to its domestic
resources, then aid is fully fungible. 3 As illustrated in Figure 1, the post-aid resource constraint is
B'C'C;  the horizontal segment, B'C',  indicates that at least the aid amount has to be spent on G2.
The new optimal resource allocation is given by the point E.  The latter indicates that in spending
the acquired aid resources on good G2,  the country diverts some of its own resources from G2 to Cp
and G1. Suppose, on the other hand, the recipient country does not divert any of its resources away
from the aided good while spending the earmarked  aid on it. This could be due to the donor agency's
effective public expenditure monitoring process.  In such a case, aid is fully non-fungible.  The
optimal allocation mix of the country's own resources is not influenced by the aid amount and point
A (in Figure 1) continues to be the country's preferred mix. Aid to G2, however, increases overall
utility. The post-aid consumption point, D, is on a higher indifference curve U2. This indicates that
even if the aid was fully non fungible, the recipient country would still benefit.  Finally, if the
country can treat a portion,  p (O0<p<l),  of the aid as a resource supplement, then aid is said to be
partially fungible and the fungible portion of the aid is given by T.  In such a case, the post-aid
resource line (not drawn in Figure 1) moves out by the fungible amount.  In choosing the optimal
resource mix, the country includes the fungible amount as an additional resource supplement to be
spent but  disregards  the non-fungible portion,  I-qp.  Depending on the  value of  p, the  final
consumption point lies between points E (p =1) and D (  =0) in Figure 1. This is the basic model
31n  the literature  on the effects  of intergovernmental  aid in federal systems,  this is known  as having  no
"flypaper' effect. See Gramlich  11969].5
that has been applied to data, when the fungibility coefficient p ls estimated (see Feyzioglu et al.,
1998, for an application).
2.2  Consequences of aidfungibility
The preceding section shows that if donor and recipient preferences differ, it is possible that
the latter could convert aid into fungible resources.  In granting aid, donors often require that
proceeds be used for the purposes for which they are granted.  The recipient could fulfill that
conditionality by spending aid money for the purposes for which it was given.  Yet, the earnarked
funds may be releasing resources-that  are already available to the recipient-for  'some  other
purpose.  Is  this  a  bad  outcome?  Not  necessarily.  Proponents  of  foreign aid  argue  that
notwithstanding the diversion of local spending, aid money is intrinsically more effective than local
spending as it comres  packaged with technical assistance and superior management skills of donor
agencies.  Indeed, it is quite likely that donor involvement may increase the rate of return on the
project.  It may also lead to changes in policy, institutions, and project design.  Yet, if aid funds
crowd-out domestiic  resources from that activity, they may end up financing, at the margim, very
different and perhaps undesirable activities.  In such a case, the developmental impact of external
assistance may be quite different from that perceived from traditional measures of project success
including the economic rate of return.6
Precluding aid fungibility appears to be simple, at least on paper.  All that is needed is
conditionality on incremental spending.  In practice, however, it is difficult to figure out what the
recipient government would have done in the absence of that donor financing.  Estimating the
counterfactual is problematic.  In most cases when they target aid to particular sectors,  donor
agencies use a proxy (e.g., the previous year's  spending) of what the recipient government would
have spent in the absence of aid.  Treating past  years' composition of spending as the pre-aid
composition may not be very meaningful if the change in domestic resources is large relative to
foreign aid. Moreover, the multiplicity of donors further complicates the analysis. The bottom line
is that in most cases it is difficult to preclude switching of donor funds at the margin.  Even if non-
fungibility can be established, the recipient may not feel "ownership" for the project if it was not
planning to  include in  its expenditure program.  The win-win situation results only  if there  is
preference  matching between the donor and the recipient and they both want to undertake the project
which would not have been feasible in the absence of donor financing.
If most aid is fungible and it is difficult to search for non-fungible projects, what choices do
the donors have to make aid more effective?  In section 3 of this paper, we argue that a solution to
this fungibility problem is to tie assistance to an overall public expenditure program (of the recipient
country) that provides adequate resources to crucial sectors. To operationalize this reform program,
the section proposes a new lending instrument-a  public expenditure reform loan (PERL). A PERL
would tie  an  institution's  lending  strategy with  the achievement of  a set  of mutually  agreed
development goals of the recipient country.
2.3  Aidfungibility:  A research review7
Past research has analyzed aid fungibility along two main lines. Gramlich [1977], McGuire
[1977], Mieszkowski and Oakland [1979], Rosen [1988], Zou [1996], among others, have studied
the fiscal effects of inter-governmental grants and subsidy programs.  Recently, there have been
several studies which have analyzed whether foreign assistance provided for specific categories of
expenditure is shifted by the recipient government, contrary to the wishes of donors.  In a mix of
cross-country  and individual country studies, Boone  [1994], Cashel-Cordo and Craig  [1990],
Devarajan et al. [1998], Feyzioglu et al. [1998], Gang and Khan [1991], Gupta  [1993], Heller
[1975], Pack and Pack [1990, 1993, 1996], and Khilji and Zampelli [1994], arnong others, have
analyzed whether foreign assistance provided for specific purposes is shifted by the recipient
government.  One study that synthesises the two approaches is Jha and Swaroop [1998] which, in
tracing the  fiscal effects of foreign aid in India,  analyzes the link between central  and  state
goverunents.
The empirical literature on the effects of intergovermnental aid in  federal systems has
generally supported Gramlich's "flypaper"  theory. (Many of these studies are summarized in Inman
[1979]).  According to this theory, an addition to resources through grants stimulates greater public
expenditure thfan  an additional dollar in local resources.  In terms of the fungibility definition of
section 2, there is little evidence that aid from higher to lower tier government is fully fungible. The
presence of a flypaper effect, however, does not preclude partial fungibility.  Using data on U.S.
local government expenditure on education for the period  1964-71, McGuire [1978] found that
restrictions placed by donors were largely ineffective and a large fraction of education grants were
converted into fungible monies.  Mcguire analyzed the impact of a grant into price and income
changing comnponents  and devised a statistical method to estimate each component from data on the8
receiver's expenditure.
The literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid is replete with studies linking aid with
macro economic variables-such  as economic growth, consumption, investment (both public and
private) and taxation-on  the one hand and outcomes such as poverty, on the other hand. 4 Despite
its importance to policy, there have been few studies which analyze economic fungibility of aid at
the level of sectoral spending. One reason has been the difficulty  in obtaining data on sector specific
aid and spending.  In a study of 46 developing countries, Cashel-Cordo and Craig [19901 analyzed
the impact of foreign aid (over the period 1975 to 1980) on the size and-composition  of government
expenditure. The expenditure components in their analysis were limited to defense and non-defense
non-debt spending.  Their main finding was that aid was quite stimulative of public spending and
none of it was spilling over into the defense budget.  Similarly, in examining the ftngibility of U.S.
aid among eight major aid recipient countries,  Khilji and Zampelli [1994] looked at defense and non-
defense expenditures.  They concluded that U.S. aid was highly fungible with a major portion
financing private sector consumption through some tax relief mechanism.
Recently there has been a number of studies that have analyzed, among other things,  the
fungibility of earmarked sectoral assistance. Several have relied on time-series data to analyze the
question of aid fungibility across the sectoral classification of expenditures (Gupta [1993], McGuire
[1978], Pack and Pack [1990, 1993, 1996]). Analyzing the foreign aid experience of Indonesia over
the period 1966 through 1986, Pack and Pack [1990] did not find any evidence of fungibility across
sectoral expenditures.  On the other hand, in their analysis of the Dominican Republic (Pack and
4For a comprehensive  review  of the foreign  aid literature, see White and Luttik [1994].9
Pack [1993]) they found major shifts from development  expenditures  to deficit reduction,  debt
service  and tax relief. Based on data from 14 developing  countries  over 20 years Feyzioglu  et al.
[1998]  found that roughly three-quarters  of a dollar given  in development  assistance  is spent on
current  expenditure  and one-quarter  on capital  expenditure  by the recipient  countries. To test aid
fungibility  across  public spending  categories,  they employed  a newly constructed  data series  on the
disbursement  of sectoral  concessionary  loans. Their findings  were: Concessionary  loans given  to
agriculture, education and  energy sectors are  fungible; only  loans to  the  transport and
communication  sector are non-fungible. Based on their findings,  the authors argued  that (a) the
success of an aid program should  not be judged by the proportion  of assistance  going to capital
expenditure  and (b) because most aid is fungible,  the rate of return on a specific  donor-funded
project tells little about the impact  of that assistance.
Yet another  recent paper on foreign aid fungibility  is by Devarajan  et al  [1998] which
analyzes  the experience  of sub-Saharan  Africa-the region  with the largest  GDP share  of aid. Based
on a data  set of 18 sub-Saharan  countries  frm 1975  through  1995,  the authors  explore  two issues:  (i)
the extent  of aid fungibility  in sub-Saharan  Africa;  and (ii)  reasons  why  aid was fungible  or not. In
terms of the first question,  they find that the broad pattern of aid fungibility  observed  in cross-
country  and country-specific  studies  is reflected  in their analysis  of African  countries. Specifically,
they find relatively  little evidence  that aid leads to greater tax relief in Africa; every dollar of aid
leads  to a 90-cent  increase  in government  spending. The effect  of aid on the composition  of public
spending  between current and capital expenditures  is also broadly consistent  with international
evidence:  Aid in Africa  leads  to an increase  in current  and capital  spending  in equal amounts. The
result that appears  as striking  is that an almost  equal amount  of aid-equal  to the amount  going for10
current and capital spending-goes  towards repaying the principal on past loans. The arguemant  that
the inability to meet debt-service payments would have threatened many African countries with a
complete cutoff from foreign capital, and therefore, the use of aid resources to relax this constraint
could have been quite rational. In their analysis of sectoral aid fungibility, Devarajan, et al. find that
sectoral aid in Africa is partially fungible: governments do not spend all sectoral aid in that sector,
nor do they treat such aid as merely budget support.
In a federal structure of governance, foreign aid could also influence the inter-governmental
fiscal transfer mechanism.  Upon receiving aid on behalf of a subsidiary government, the federal
government could make adjustments in its fiscal transfers to that lower level of government.  An
example of this comes from the practice of "Budget Offset" in Ethiopia, a federal country.  The
federal govermnent reduces the budget subsidy to states-which  is based on a formula that includes
weights for population, development indicators and state's own revenue efforts-by  the full amount
of expected external loans and grants that have been committed by donors towards projects in the
respective states.  While no such direct budgetary mechanism exists in India, concerns have been
raised that states that procure externally aided projects are not able to reap the full benefits; central-
government transfers to states are reduced when foreign aid is secured for state projects.  In India
almost all external assistance (including funds earmarked for projects for the state governments)
accrues to the central government, which is also liable for any repayments. Jha and Swaroop [1998]
look at this issue.  They find that external assistance intended for development purposes merely
substitutes for spending that governments-central  and states-would  have undertaken anyway; the
funds freed by aid are spent on non-development activities in general and administrative services in
particular.  Moreover, in passing external assistance to states, the central government makes a11
reduction  in other transfers  to states.
3.  Lending Instruments and Strategies: The Implications of Economic  Fungibility
At this point, a natural question  to ask is: "So what?" Fungibility  may be a fact of life, and
recent empirical evidence seems to support this notion, but are there any implications for
development  policy?  We now argue  that there are two, rather profound,  implications  for donor
assistance. The first has to do with how  donors  evaluate  the impact  of development  assistance. If
funds  are fungible,  the traditional  approach  of calculating  the project's  rate of return  will clearly  not
answer  the question  of the impact  of the aid-since the aid is financing  some  other  expenditure  than
the project (Devarajan  et al. [1997]). The second  implication  has to do with the instruments  used
by donors  to deliver  aid. If funds  are fungible,  and  the recipient's  public  expenditure  program  is not
satisfactory,  then project lending  may not be a cost-effective  instrument. If the country's public
expenditure  program  is satisfactory,  the donor  may as well  finance  a portion  of this program,  rather
than concentrate  on individual  projects.
3.1  Evaluating dlevelopment  assistance
Consider  the following  problem. A country  has a public  expenditure  program  of $100  million,
consisting  of $40  million  in education  expenditures,  $40 million  in agriculture,  and $20 million  in
expenditures  abouit  which  we know  nothing. The  rates  of return  on education  and agriculture  are 30
and 20 percent,  respectively.  A donor is considering  a $10  million  primary-education  project that
has a rate of retum of 35 percent. What is the development  impact  of the $10 million?
Once we realize  that aid may  be fungible,  the answer  is not straightforward.  Even though the12
primary-education  project has a high rate of return, if it is a project the government  would have
undertaken  anyway,  the donor's $10  million  is releasing  resources  for some  other component  of the
public expenditure  program, possibly something  in the "unknown"  category. The development
impact  of the $10  million  could  be the rate of return of one of these  unknown  expenditures. In any
event,  the development  impact  is almost  surely  not 35 percent.
Yet, donors  spend enormous  resources  calculating  the rate of return on their  projects (or some
other  summary  measure  of the project's net benefit). As a first step, then,  these  resources  could  be
better  spent on appraising  the recipient's overall  public expenditure  program,  so we have a better
idea of where the marginal  dollar is going. Second,  donors and the development  community  in
general  should  not read too much into the traditional  rate of return  calculations.  For instance,  it is
not at all surprising  that  the correlation  between  World  Bank  project  rates  of retum and  the country's
growth  rate is around 0.3. The Bank's loans  may have been financing  projects with much lower
rates  of return than those  in the appraisal  document.
We should emphasize  that calculating  the rate of return to projects is still important for the
recipient  country. The calculations  (if done properly)  indicate  whether  the project is beneficial  to
the country. They  could  be used  to guide  the country's  resource  allocation  process. But they  should
not be used by donors to evaluate the impact of external assistance,  much less guide resource
allocation  within donor agencies.
3.2  Lending instruments
If a country's  overall  public  expenditure  program  (PEP)  is satisfactory,  then  r the donor  could
just as well finance  a portion  of that program,  rather than  appraise  and finance  individual  projects.13
If the PEP is not satisfactory,  then  projects  are not achieving  their development  impact. These two
statements  lead to the question  of whether  projects  are the most appropriate  vehicle for delivering
assistance.
The altennative,  which has been dubbed  a Public  Expenditure  Refonm  Loan  (PERL)  at The
World Bank, would  involve  replacing  all project loans  to a country  with direct  budgetary  support,
based on an agreement  about the quality of the country's public expenditure  program. Such an
instrument  has several  advantages:
3  Cost-efficiency:  The Bank would save on appraisal  and preparation  costs of the individual
loans  to the country. The additional  cost of appraising  the country's PEP-currently estimated
at about $250,000-is  still substantially  less than  the administrative  costs of projects.
*  Leverage: At present,  the donor  can only influence  policies  in the sectors  he is involved  in. Yet
if, due  to fungibility,  the donor's  money  is going  to other  sectors,  there  could  be significant  gains
if the donor could  help improve  the policy  framework  in those  sectors. By financing  a portion
of the budget, a PERL provides  that kind of leverage.
*  Donor coordination:  Everyone  agrees  that  more coordination  by donors  is better. But this
has been difficult  to achieve,  partly because individual  donors  have a preference  for projects
(usually  with the national  flag flying  over them). By agreeing  on a public  expenditure  program
and financing  a portion  of it, the Bank  can credibly  ask other  donors  to do the same.
There  would  still  be a role for projects  in the aid relationship,  but now it will be concentrated  on the14
transfer  of know-how  and  policy  advice,  rather  than on financing.  Typically,  these  two are bundled
together  in a project,  which  means  they  are supplied  in fixed  coefficients.  PERLs  permit  the two to
be unbundled,  and the scale of each tailored  to the country's individual  needs.
Despite their advantages,  PERLs contain some risks as well.  They are likely to elicit
resistance  from the recipient  countries,  especially  those that are uncomfortable  with having their
whole  public  expenditure  program  scrutinized.  At the same  time,  PERLs  may not find  much support
among  traditional  project specialists  in donor institutions. But the point is whether  converting  all
lending  into a single  instrument  such as a PERL is an improvement  over the status  quo. In light of
the evidence  on fungibility,  it certainly  must be.15
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